# NEG

## Bioterror neg

### No biotech theft

#### Lab security is thorough and effective

Chamlee ‘17, Interviewing Damon, 17 Virginia Chamlee, interviewing Inger K. Damon, MD, PhD, the director of the CDC's Division of High-Consequence Pathogens and Pathology, incident commander for the CDC Ebola Response. [This Is What It’s Like to Work with The World's Deadliest Pathogens Every Day, 6-19-2017, https://www.buzzfeed.com/vchamlee/this-is-what-its-like-to-work-with-the-worlds-deadliest]

Entering a BSL-4 lab requires typing in a unique key code, undergoing an iris scan, and removing all personal clothing, jewelry, and accessories (with the exception of eyeglasses). Next, workers don clothing for the lab: a scrub suit, socks, and inner gloves. Then comes the "spacesuit” — i.e., a full-body, positive-pressure biosafety suit, which Damon said “pushes air out to prevent anything from coming in.” A 2007 photo of the BSL-4 lab &quot;spacesuits.&quot; The suits the scientists currently wear are white instead of orange, and have white boots and black gloves. CDC / Via phil.cdc.gov A 2007 photo of the BSL-4 lab "spacesuits." The suits the scientists currently wear are white instead of orange, and have white boots and black gloves. The suit is so large it adds a solid two to three inches to anyone’s height, thereby restricting movement and making laboratory work even more difficult than it is already. With no air coming in, it also creates a dehydrating environment — which is not necessarily a bad thing, considering how difficult it would be to take a bathroom break. The lab’s security features read like something from Mission: Impossible, specially engineered to prevent microorganisms from being disseminated into the environment. The walls are made of thick, solid concrete, designed to maintain pressure differentials and withstand natural disasters. In essence, they form a sealed internal shell — “to facilitate fumigation and prohibit animal and insect intrusion,” according to the CDC. Floors are designed with a watertight seal. Laboratory furniture is simple, void of sharp corners, and covered in a nonporous material to allow for easy decontamination. Windows (if there are any) are shatter-resistant and sealed. Eating, drinking, smoking, handling contact lenses, applying cosmetics, and storing food for human consumption is, perhaps unsurprisingly, entirely off-limits. No phones are allowed inside the lab, but there is a computer from which scientists can access emails and files (though they’d have to do so wearing gloves that make typing a challenge). With the exception of the scientists themselves, who enter and exit the lab each day, nothing can get out. With no air coming in, it also creates a dehydrating environment — which is not necessarily a bad thing, considering how difficult it would be to take a bathroom break. “Any way the virus could potentially escape, there are at least two ways to prevent that from happening,” Damon told BuzzFeed. “The samples are kept in biosafety cabinets, there’s negative pressure in the room, doors are airtight and gasketed. There are multiple ways that, when air is coming out of the lab, it’s then purified and cleaned. And any waste products generated in the lab are autoclaved [i.e., placed into a pressure chamber to sterilize medical waste] and incinerated.” Upon leaving the lab, workers step into a decontamination chamber, which showers a mix of chemicals over their suits to decontaminate anything that may be on the surface. From the chemical shower, they go through an inner changing room, where they take off the suit and everything worn beneath it. The clothing worn in the lab under the spacesuit is treated as a potentially contaminated material, and thoroughly decontaminated before being laundered. Next, lab workers must take a personal shower before entering an outer changing area, where they can then dress into street clothes.

### Biotech not key to weapons

#### Biotech won’t be used for weapons or terrorism

Cross 21 (Glenn A. Cross, Founder of the Crossbow Analytics LLC, which focuses on Chemical Bioweapons; is a member of the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, “*BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS IN THE ‘SHADOW WAR’*” [https://warontherocks.com/2017/08/long-ignored-the-use-of-chemical-and-biological-weapons-against-insurgents/] Accessed 6/25/22, TR)

The **threat** of terrorists using biological agents exists but is very limited. The fear of nonstate actors using biological agents rose with Aum Shinrikyo’s 1995 failed efforts to spread botulinum and anthrax in Japan. Fears of bioterror reached its most recent crescendo with the 2001 anthrax letter mailings, coming as they did within weeks after the 9/11 attacks. The threat of further bioterror attacks, however, never materialized.

Despite the fact that terrorist biological weapons attacks have not materialized since the Amerithrax scare, some continue to argue that the supposed ease and lower cost of biological weapons development, production, and use along with the societal disruption of COVID-19 has incentivized bad actors to adopt biological weapons. These concerns have been echoed by others who assume that misuse is inevitable and following the COVID-19 example will result in mass casualties and crippling political, societal, and economic repercussions.

However, the bioterror threat seems to have **diminished** — not grown — since the 2001 Amerithrax letter mailings. The core al-Qaeda biological weapons efforts were first envisioned in the late 1990s and began in earnest shortly afterward. Yet the U.S. invasion of Afghanistan and the fall of the Taliban in late 2001 effectively disrupted al-Qaeda’s biological weapons work which largely centered on anthrax. Left without a suitable safe haven, al-Qaeda was never able to reconstitute its biological weapons efforts. The Taliban’s return to power in Afghanistan, however, may result in a reemergence of al-Qaeda and its biological weapons ambitions. Time will tell whether the Taliban now will grant safe haven to al-Qaeda that could be used for biological weapons work. What is undoubted is that the Taliban and al-Qaeda have a shared history and have continued to work closely together. Without a presence in Afghanistan, U.S. intelligence will have a more difficult time detecting any resurgent al-Qaeda biological weapons efforts.

The threat of a biological weapons effort by the Islamic State in Iraq **never materialized**, although the group did manage to produce and use chemical weapons agents until that program was effectively disrupted. Other terrorist groups’ interest in biological weapons has been rudimentary with a focus predominately on toxins such as ricin and botulinum. U.S. domestic extremists, self-radicalized individuals, and lone actors also have gravitated toward ricin, but no known casualties have resulted from the decades-long interest in ricin.

Some analysts, however, argue that the life science revolution and global proliferation of related scientific and technical capabilities has opened a Pandora’s Box of biothreats. The argument goes that the rapid revolution in genetic engineering — including synthetic biology — the DIY bio movement, and the advent of technologies like CRISPR (acronym for “clustered regularly interspaced short palindromic repeats”) makes their misuse likely. However, as noted in the 2018 National Academies of Science report, Biodefense in the Age of Synthetic Biology, the large-scale production and delivery of biological weapons agents is **inherently difficult**, with biological weapons use favoring small-scale, highly targeted attacks.

### Bioterror defense

#### Biotech doesn’t risk bioterrorism – overstated capacity, only states can do it

Hamilton et al2021 (R. A. Hamilton United Nations Interregional Crime and Justice Research Institute (UNICRI), Turin, Italy R. Mampuys Netherlands Commission on Genetic Modifcation (COGEM), Bilthoven, The Netherlands S. E. Galaitsi (\*) US Army Corps of Engineers, Concord, MA, United States A. Collins EPFL International Risk Governance Center, Lausanne, Switzerland I. Istomin Schaffhausen Institute of Technology (SIT), Schaffhausen, Switzerland M. Ahteensuu University of Turku, Turku, Finland L. Bakanidze EU CBRN CoE Regional Secretariat for Central Asia, Tashkent, Uzbekistan) “ Opportunities, Challenges, and Future Considerations for Top-Down Governance for Biosecurity and Synthetic Biology,” CONFERENCE PAPER, <https://link.springer.com/chapter/10.1007/978-94-024-2086-9_3> (Accessed 6-27-22)-AO

In relation to existing top-down governance measures for biosecurity, synthetic biology represents a promising yet potentially destabilizing advancement in the life sciences, one that could introduce new risks and regulatory challenges. In particular, a number of high-profle synthetic biology experiments, ranging from the de novo synthesis of poliovirus (Cello et al. 2002) to the recent synthesis of horsepox virus (Noyce et al. 2018), have raised concerns that the same techniques could be exploited to bypass regulatory controls (e.g. the United States, US, Select Agent Regulations) on lists of high-risk pathogens. Moreover, the possibility of synthesizing novel ‘taxonomically unclassifed’ pathogens (NSABB 2006; Garfnkel et al. 2007) has led some to question the logic and utility of current ‘list-based’ approaches to regulation. Looking to the future, if synthetic biology does, in fact, ‘deskill’ the ‘art’ of biological engineering, new regulatory approaches could very well be essential because the tools of modern biology will be widely accessible to both responsible and malicious actors. Claims about synthetic biology’s potential, like other emerging technologies, nonetheless tend to overstate its ‘enabling’ capacity. Likewise, the ease of producing biological weapons tends to be overstated. As a number of commentators note, biology is not yet easy to engineer (Jefferson et al. 2014) and, for the foreseeable future, the skills necessary to produce biological weapons are likely to remain only within the grasp of states (Piers Millet in Regalado 2016). However, the feld’s emphasis on eliminating technical barriers and reducing the importance of tacit knowledge (Oye 2012) represents a powerful source of expectation for advocates and critics alike. For advocates, it represents the possible realization of modern biology’s full potential, one that could yield revolutionary advances in health, medicine, and industry in the twenty-frst century. For critics, it represents a seemingly openended risk that requires exceptional precaution. For national governments, and international conventions responsible for establishing global biosecurity norms and obligations that are operationalized at the national level  through legislation and other regulatory tools (McLeish and Nightingale 2007), a central question is how (if at all) does top-down biosecurity governance need to change in response to synthetic biology?

#### Non-State actors fail to develop biological weapons

Parachini, Former director of RAND, and Gunaratna, 22

Parachini, J. V., & Gunaratna, Rohan Kumar. (2022, May 31). *Implications of the Pandemic for Terrorist Interest in Biological Weapons: Islamic State and al-Qaeda Pandemic Case Studies*. Rand.org; RAND Corporation. <https://www.rand.org/pubs/research_reports/RRA612-1.html>, accessed 6/25/22, , FLC

‌Some policymakers and analysts have expressed concern that weaknesses in responses to the coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID-19) pandemic will motivate terrorists to seek biological weapons. However, an examination of the Islamic State (IS) and al-Qaeda narratives about the pandemic reveals no causal relationship between the pandemic and any heightened interest in biological weapons. A review of the historical pursuit of biological weapons by the IS and by al-Qaeda reveals that both groups evinced some interest, but ultimately each employed conventional forms of attack instead. Despite limited IS use of chemical agents that challenged the taboo against the use of poison as a weapon, there are formidable hurdles that nonstate actors must clear to develop, produce, and use biological agents as weapons.

Although the prospect of the IS and al-Qaeda pursuing biological weapons is not zero, it is unlikely, given both the difficulties and the much easier and readily available alternatives that meet their deadly objectives. In the wake of the pandemic, several measures can enhance capabilities to address both public health and military challenges. These measures reduce the possibility of and improve the response to a future naturally occurring pandemic while also helping to deter, prevent, and respond to any possible terrorist acquisition and use of biological weapons. Focusing unduly on the potential, but unlikely, terrorist use of biological materials as weapons skews resources to unique military and counterterrorism measures and away from measures that are useful in both events. In the post-pandemic period, governments need to rebalance their efforts.

Key Findings

Looking at both the historical baselines and the pandemic-era narratives of the IS and al-Qaeda, neither group seems likely to use biological materials in future attacks as a consequence of the global COVID-19 pandemic

It is unlikely that an actor with only modest knowledge can access the necessary materials and fashion a biological weapon.

The prospects of an individual or a group successfully accomplishing all the necessary steps are not zero, but given the difficulty involved in developing such weapons and the fact that conventional weapon alternatives are readily available, nonstate actors have routinely chosen other means of attack.

Even such terrorist groups as the IS and al-Qaeda, which have not hesitated to commit terrible acts of violence, have not demonstrated a concerted effort to develop biological weapons, and their chemical weapon activities have thus far been much less deadly than their conventional weapon attacks.

COVID-19 and the effects of global climate change are stern prompts to reimagine threats to national and international security

Prioritizing threats is a difficult task, particularly when threats are novel.

Although individuals and reports issued warnings about the possibility of a pandemic, other near-term or long-feared postulated threats took precedent.

Slow-moving and naturally occurring events rarely get the same attention as hostile states or terrorist groups, and feared “bolt from the blue” attacks from states or terrorists have tended to dominate the thinking of political leaders and national security experts.

## China neg

### China not rising fast enough

#### U.S. already has the biotech edge, not falling behind in terms of competitiveness

Scott Moore ’21, February 17, a lecturer in political science at the University of Pennsylvania and previously served at the U.S. Department of State, where he worked on the Paris Agreement, “In Biotech, the Industry of the Future, the U.S. Is Way Ahead of China,” LAWFARE, https://link.springer.com/content/pdf/10.1007/978-94-024-2086-9.pdf

It was supposed to be China’s moment of technological triumph—one that would show the world Beijing had not only conquered the coronavirus but also emerged as a biotechnology superpower. But when clinical data on China’s flagship CoronaVac vaccine finally flowed in, they showed it was barely more than 50 percent effective—just clearing the minimum standard set by the World Health Organization. In contrast, not one but two vaccines developed by U.S. firms have been found to be upward of 95 percent effective, a standard no other country’s vaccines have yet met in rigorous clinical trials. The United States’s overall track record in responding to the pandemic has been awful. Yet the success of its vaccine development efforts shows that when it comes to biotechnology, the industry of the future, the U.S. is way ahead of China and most of its other rivals.

A continuing refrain from Washington in recent years has been that the United States is falling behind China in the development of critical emerging technologies. In some fields, this may be true. But not in biotechnology. To be sure, China’s biotech sector is growing at a torrid pace, and some of its firms are becoming leaders in certain areas, such as cancer treatment. Yet the U.S. retains a dominant position in research, development and commercialization, accounting for almost half of all biotech patents filed from 1999 to 2013. The triumph of its biotechnology industry during the coronavirus pandemic, producing two highly effective vaccines using an entirely new approach based on messenger RNA, and in record time, shows that the U.S.’s competitive edge in biotechnology remains largely intact. And that has important implications as Washington gears up for a sustained period of geopolitical competition with Beijing.

### China coop not conflict

#### Biotechnology will produce US-China cooperation, not conflict

Moore and Coplin ’22, April 8. Scott Moore is Director of China Programs and Strategic Initiatives and Lecturer in Political Science at the University of Pennsylvania, where he teaches Chinese politics, Abigail Coplin is an Assistant Professor of Sociology and Science, Technology, and Society at Vassar College. Her research analyzes the development of China’s biotechnology and agrobiotechnology. “Closing the U.S. to Chinese Biotech Would Do Far More Harm Than Good,” CHINA FILE, <https://www.chinafile.com/reporting-opinion/viewpoint/closing-us-chinese-biotech-would-do-far-more-harm-good>; Analina

Yet at the same time, Washington and Beijing have good reasons to see certain areas of biotechnology as grounds for cooperation rather than conflict or competition. The most advanced areas of biotechnology, like gene editing and synthetic biology, are double-edged swords. They show great promise to help cure chronic diseases and develop drought-resistant crops, but also to create dangerous new viruses, human genetic modifications, and even genetically-engineered terrorism. The risks and threats posed by these emerging biotechnologies cannot be confined to any one country. Potentially dangerous biotechnology research can be undertaken virtually anywhere, meaning that all countries need to develop and enforce rules preventing research that could create new viruses or bioweapons, for example. China is an especially important player in international biosafety and biosecurity, and the country’s 2020 legislation on both topics is, on paper at least, among the most stringent in the world. Gene therapy trials based on somatic editing are underway in both the U.S. and China, and as researchers in both countries begin to tinker with the fundamental building blocks of life, engagement on the use of these groundbreaking, but potentially dangerous, technologies is needed both to ensure transparency as well as to begin the difficult process of establishing mutually-agreed rules and norms.

### China hegemony defense

#### Chinese hegemony has structural limitations

Andrew Nathan '22, March/April, Class of 1919 Professor of Political Science at Columbia University, "A Rival of America’s Making? The Debate Over Washington’s China Strategy," FOREIGN AFFAIRS, https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/china/2022-02-11/china-strategy-rival-americas-making

The country’s geographic position is also unfavorable. Along its land and sea borders, China confronts distrustful neighbors. Among them are seven of the 15 most populous countries in the world (India, Indonesia, Japan, Pakistan, the Philippines, Russia, and Vietnam) and five countries with which China has fought wars within the past 80 years (India, Japan, Russia, South Korea, and Vietnam). None of China’s neighbors is culturally Chinese or ideologically aligned with the Chinese Communist Party. All may cooperate with China at various times and to varying degrees for strategic or economic reasons, but all seek to hedge against Chinese domination, often by cultivating relations with the United States. As Chinese behavior has become more assertive, this counterbalancing behavior is growing more evident. India has compromised its traditional strategic autonomy in order to participate in joint military exercises with Australia, Japan, and the United States as part of the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue, known as the Quad. Japan has taken the unprecedented step of officially declaring stability in the Taiwan Strait to be a national interest. And Australia has reaffirmed its U.S. alliance by accepting help in acquiring nuclear-powered submarines under the 2021 AUKUS agreement. China is unlikely to achieve anything like hegemony over any but the smallest of its neighbors.

Geography helps explain another Chinese weakness: its lack of allies other than North Korea. There are countries that are nearby enough to receive substantial help from China in the case of a military conflict, but they all fear China more than they fear any other state. The lack of allies is more a liability than an asset, for it deprives China of ways to multiply the pressure it can put on uncooperative neighbors and of the ability to position sizable military forces around the world. To be sure, none of the United States’ 60-some allies and partners has interests identical to Washington’s. None can be counted on to follow every component of U.S. strategy toward China. But U.S. alliances and partnerships still complicate China’s military calculations, increase the pressure on Beijing to comply with the international norms preferred by other states, and expand the alternatives available to countries considering whether to accept Chinese investments.

Nor is the structural distribution of international power favorable to Chinese global dominance. Barring catastrophic mismanagement by other states, China will continue to face five powerful rivals—India, Japan, Russia, the United States, and the European Union—in a multipolar system that is not going to disappear. A unipolar moment, if one ever really existed, cannot be re-created, not by the United States and certainly not by China.

### China war defense

#### War with China won’t go nuclear

Andrew Nathan '22, March/April, Class of 1919 Professor of Political Science at Columbia University, "A Rival of America’s Making? The Debate Over Washington’s China Strategy," FOREIGN AFFAIRS, https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/china/2022-02-11/china-strategy-rival-americas-making

THREAT PERCEPTION

The challenge the United States faces from China is bad enough without exaggerating it. As realism would predict, Beijing is dissatisfied with the status quo: it is closely hemmed in by Washington’s allies, partners, and military forces; its supply lines are vulnerable to U.S. interdiction; and its society is influenced by American culture. China wants to push the United States away from its shores and weaken its alliances, and this means a real chance of conflict, especially over Taiwan. I agree with Mearsheimer that if such a war occurred, it would probably be a limited war, albeit highly destructive and tragic. I also agree that it would have the potential—not a great one, but more than zero—to escalate to a nuclear exchange.

But Mearsheimer is wrong to describe China’s determination to gain control over Taiwan as either “emotional” or “expansionist,” because these descriptors make China sound irrationally aggressive. Mearsheimer’s own theory of realism better explains why Beijing will not lose its appetite for Taiwan, given the long-standing legal basis of its sovereignty claim and the island’s strategic, economic, and technological importance to Chinese security. Also consistent with realism is China’s preference for avoiding a premature strike on Taiwan and instead deterring Taiwanese independence as long as it takes to achieve what Beijing calls “peaceful reunification.” But deterring Taiwanese independence has meant that China has had to build up military assets capable of threatening the aircraft carriers and forward air and naval bases that the United States has long relied on to stave off any attempt to take Taiwan by force. The result: a U.S.-Chinese arms race that raises the risk of war through miscalculation.

And Mearsheimer is wrong to describe Beijing’s goal as global dominance. In a multipolar world, China will seek to shape global institutions to its advantage, just as major powers have always done. But it has no proposal for an alternative, Beijing-dominated set of institutions. It remains strongly committed to the global free-trade regime, as well as to the UN and that organization’s alphabet soup of agencies. It participates actively in the UN human rights system in order to help its allies and frustrate its rivals. Its Belt and Road Initiative operates alongside, rather than in place of, long-standing Western-funded development programs. China seeks influence, but it has little prospect of dominance as long as other powers also stay active in these institutions.

Overestimating the China threat is just as dangerous as underestimating it. Hyping the hazard makes it harder to manage, by creating panic among both the American public and Chinese policymakers. Whether or not engagement was the mistake that Mearsheimer claims, whether or not there was ever an option to constrain China’s growth as he believes, we are where we are. I agree with Mearsheimer that what the United States must do now is manage the situation—which should mean not exacerbating what is already, on cold realist grounds, a serious challenge.

### Econ defense

#### Economic collapse doesn’t cause war

Daniel Drezner ’14, January, professor of International Law at Tufts, The System Worked: Global Economic Governance during the Great Recession, World Politics, Volume 66. Number 1, online

The final significant outcome addresses a dog that hasn't barked: the effect of the Great Recession on cross-border conflict and violence. During the initial stages of the crisis, multiple analysts asserted that the financial crisis would lead states to increase their use of force as a tool for staying in power.42 They voiced genuine concern that the global economic downturn would lead to an increase in conflict—whether through greater internal repression, diversionary wars, arms races, or a ratcheting up of great power conflict. Violence in the Middle East, border disputes in the South China Sea, and even the disruptions of the Occupy movement fueled impressions of a surge in global public disorder.

**The** aggregate data suggest otherwise, however. The Institute for Economics and Peace has concluded that "the average level of peacefulness in 2012 is approximately the same as it was in 2007."43 Interstate violence in particular has declined since the start of the financial crisis, as have military expenditures in most sampled countries. Other studies confirm that the Great Recession has not triggered any increase in violent conflict, as Lotta Themner and Peter Wallensteen conclude: "[T]he pattern is one of relative stability when we consider the trend for the past five years."44 The secular decline in violence that started with the end of the Cold War has not been reversed. Rogers Brubaker observes that "the crisis has not to date generated the surge in protectionist nationalism or ethnic exclusion that might have been expected."45

#### No diversionary war.

Elad Segev et al. ‘21. Tel Aviv University AND Atsushi Tago and Kohei Watanabe, Waseda University. "Could Leaders Deflect from Political Scandals? Cross-National Experiments on Diversionary Action in Israel and Japan". TAYLOR & FRANCIS, https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/03050629.2022.2044326

The diversionary theory of war is one of the best-known conflict initiation theories focusing on democratic leaders’ incentives. According to the theory, democratic leaders who face greater electoral challenges, either due to political scandals or an economic downturn, are more likely to choose provocative foreign policies and seek to lead the country into diplomatic crises, in hopes of inciting nationalistic sentiments that will boost their approval ratings via the so-called “rally around the flag” effect (e.g. Gaines 2002; Hetherington and Nelson 2003; Mueller 1973).

Despite the intuitive appeal of this theory, empirical studies have been largely unable to find consistent evidence to corroborate the purported theoretical mechanisms. Findings from observational studies have been quite mixed. The fact that a diverse set of findings have been reported from observational studies suggests that unobservable confounders arising from strategic interactions greatly hinder our ability to tease out the causal effect of electoral hardship on conflict behaviors.

In this research note, we claim that the key assumption of the theory does not work as expected. That is, a political leader cannot divert attention from his/her political scandals by emphasizing a foreign threat and alerting the general public that the country may go to war against an enemy. Although the assumptions that the threat or use of force is salient and that an acute enemy threat would create a rally-around-the-flag effect are common, they have rarely been tested at a micro-level in an experimental setting. Our team conducted a cross-national experiment to find out whether and how political leaders could divert the public’s attention away from their political scandals.

### Nuclear war defense

#### Conflicts won’t go nuclear – use-it-or-lose-it is a fallacy

Kroenig, Mathew, Professor in the department of government at Georgetown, Winter 2021 (“Will Emerging Technology Cause Nuclear War?: Bringing Geopolitics Back In”, Air University, Winter, 2021, <https://www.airuniversity.af.edu/Portals/10/SSQ/documents/Volume-15_Issue-4/D-Kroenig.pdf>, accessed 6/27/22, ,FLC)

There are several limitations, however, to the existing analysis. First, the underlying theory of nuclear conflict this body of thought advances is debatable. It rests heavily on the “use it or lose it” cause of nuclear war, but use it or lose it is rooted in the logical fallacy of the false dilemma.12 States have many options in a crisis other than suffering a disarming nuclear attack or launching one. Moreover, faced with a range of choices, the use-it-or-lose-it logic assumes a state will intentionally choose to initiate a nuclear war—the most risky and costly available option. The use-it-or-lose-it pathway to nuclear war, therefore, is in tension with mainstream nuclear deterrence theory that maintains states will be reluctant to conduct a deliberate attack on another nuclear-armed state.13

A second limitation of this approach is that theories of nuclear instability developed in the early days of the Cold War are in tension with current understandings of the causes of war in contemporary international relations theory. The nuclear stability framework rests on the notion that parity in the balance of power is associated with peace. The prevailing bargaining model of war, however, maintains that parity contributes to uncertainty about the balances of power and resolve, which hinders efforts to reach negotiated settlements short of armed conflict.14 The empirical record supports this theory and demonstrates parity in the balance of power is associated with conflict, and uneven balances of power are associated with peace.15 Situations of obvious strategic nuclear superiority, therefore, may be more stable than situations of strategic parity.

## Democracy NEG

### Democracy doesn’t solve stuff

#### Democracy is overrated – accountability is not proven nor is solvency for war

Daniel Larison ’12, PhD in history from the University of Chicago, “Democratic Peace Theory Is False,” THE AMERICAN CONSERVATIVE, http://www.theamericanconservative.com/larison/democratic-peace-theory-is-false/

Rojas’ claim depends entirely on the meaning of “genuine democracy.” Even though there are numerous examples of wars between states with universal male suffrage and elected governments (including that little dust-up known as WWI), the states in question probably don’t qualify as “genuine” democracies and so can’t be used as counter-examples. Regardless, democratic peace theory draws broad conclusions from a short period in modern history with very few cases before the 20th century. The core of democratic peace theory as I understand it is that democratic governments are more accountable to their populations, and because the people will bear the costs of the war they are going to be less willing to support a war policy. This supposedly keeps democratic states from waging wars against one another because of the built-in electoral and institutional checks on government power. One small problem with this is that it is rubbish.

Democracies in antiquity fought against one another. Political equality and voting do not abolish conflicts of interest between competing states. Democratic peace theory doesn’t account for the effects of nationalist and imperialist ideologies on the way democratic nations think about war. Democratic nations that have professional armies to do the fighting for them are often enthusiastic about overseas wars. The Conservative-Unionist government that waged the South African War (against two states with elected governments, I might add) enjoyed great popular support and won a huge majority in the “Khaki” election that followed.

As long as it goes well and doesn’t have too many costs, war can be quite popular, and even if the war is costly it may still be popular if it is fought for nationalist reasons that appeal to a majority of the public. If the public is whipped into thinking that there is an intolerable foreign threat or if they believe that their country can gain something at relatively low cost by going to war, the type of government they have really is irrelevant. Unless a democratic public believes that a military conflict will go badly for their military, they may be ready to welcome the outbreak of a war that they expect to win. Setting aside the flaws and failures of U.S.-led democracy promotion for a moment, the idea that reducing the number of non-democracies makes war less likely is just fantasy. Clashing interests between states aren’t going away, and the more democratic states there are in the world the more likely it is that two or more of them will eventually fight one another.

#### Best research shows democracy doesn’t produce peace

Jeff Grabmeier ‘15. Senior Director, Research communications, Media & PR “‘Democratic peace' may not prevent international conflict,” https://phys.org/news/2015-09-democratic-peace-international-conflict.html

Using a new technique to analyze 52 years of international conflict, researchers suggest that there may be no such thing as a "democratic peace."

In addition, a model developed with this new technique was found to predict international conflict five and even ten years in the future better than any existing model.

Democratic peace is the widely held theory that democracies are less likely to go to war against each other than countries with other types of government.

In the new study, researchers found that economic trade relationships and participation in international governmental organizations play a strong role in keeping the peace among countries. But democracy? Not so much.

"That's a startling finding because the value of joint democracy in preventing war is what we thought was the closest thing to a law in international politics," said Skyler Cranmer, lead author of the study and The Carter Phillips and Sue Henry Associate Professor of Political Science at The Ohio State University.

"There's been empirical research supporting this theory for the past 50 years. Even U.S. presidents have touted the value of a democratic peace, but it doesn't seem to hold up, at least the way we looked at it."

### NATO bad

#### NATO is obsolete – technology is not a game-changer

Simon Jenkins ’18, June 12, Guardian columnist, “Donald Trump is right. Nato is a costly white elephant,” THE GUARDIAN, <https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2018/jul/12/donald-trump-nato-costly-white-elephant-russia>

I regard Trump as an aberration, a temporary trauma afflicting US politics. He honours the thesis of the historian Arthur Schlesinger, that America’s constitution often drives the republic to the abyss, only to drag it back again. But even monsters can ask the occasional good question. Thus Trump this week on Nato, a body so mired in platitude and waffle it has lost sight of its true purpose. Trump wants to know what Europe really regards as its defence policy, for he thinks it takes America for a ride. Nato was founded in 1949 in response to Stalin’s blockade of Berlin. It was meant to “keep the Soviet Union out, the Americans in, and the Germans down”. Since then, it has welcomed the American nuclear shield, at vast cost to America. Otherwise, its only military achievements have been the breakup of Yugoslavia and the loss of a squalid 17-year war in Afghanistan. Neither has anything to do with the North Atlantic. Nothing better symbolised this than Theresa May’s bizarre gift to Trump this week of 450 British troops for Kabul.

Nato was about deterring an attack on Europe from Russia. In 1945, the west agreed the Potsdam settlement, accepting the Soviets’ “sphere of influence” over eastern Europe. Thus when Russia invaded Hungary in 1956 and Czechoslovakia in 1968, there was no question of Nato, or Europe, retaliating. The iron curtain was iron.

Come 1989 and the collapse of Potsdam Europe, Nato did not approach a broken Russia to agree some new settlement. It did the opposite. To protests from Russia’s weakened leader, Boris Yeltsin, it gathered former Warsaw Pact states under its wing and advanced its border east towards Russia. It embraced Poland, Czechoslovakia and Hungary, then the Baltic states, Romania and Bulgaria. It was like Khrushchev stationing missiles in Cuba. Only Germany counselled caution.

Nato’s provocation was so blatant as to be an open invitation to any new populist leader in Moscow to exploit Russia’s bruised patriotism: hence Vladimir Putin. He and his kleptocratic cronies are virtually a Nato creation. But the fact that America was party to the provocation does not invalidate Trump’s question. What is Nato’s policy beyond needling Russia and feebly relying on the American shield?

It is astonishing that, three decades after 1989, Europe is almost back to a cold war with Moscow. As winner of the last war, Nato was primarily responsible for lowering tension and making peace. Instead it revelled in victory. If Europe wants to hire an America nuclear shield, it should deal with America over how to pay for it. But the current tit-for-tat hostilities with Russia are playing with fire, and counterproductive. Europe’s land forces are so weak they would be wiped out by Russia in a matter of days. So is Europe really expecting Washington to order a nuclear barrage against Russian “grey area” incursions into the Baltics, let alone a conflict with Orbán’s Hungary or Erdoğan’s Turkey – both Nato members?

This is not realistic, any more than was American intervention during Russia’s incursion in Ukraine or Georgia. That is why Orbán and Erdoğan are wisely cosying up to Putin. Nato is adrift of realpolitik.

Trump is effectively telling Europe that its Nato is as outdated as the Congress of Vienna by the time of Bismarck. He is wrong to rabbit on about spending 2% or 4% of GDP on weapons. This helps no one but the defence industries – spending should meet plausible threat, not some vague budget target. But no more helpful is Europe’s belligerent posturing towards Moscow, such as Britain’s reaction to the mysterious Wiltshire poisonings. Entrenching Putin behind a siege economy is not a defence policy.

#### NATO doesn’t fund their military enough to be useful

Christian Whiton ’18, July 6, Senior Fellow at the Center for the National Interest, “NATO Is Obsolete” THE NATIONAL INTEREST, https://nationalinterest.org/feature/nato-obsolete-25167?page=0%2C1

After the alliance was established in 1949, its first secretary general, Lord Hastings Ismay, summed up its purpose concisely: “to keep the Russians out, the Americans in, and the Germans down.” The unofficial mission matched the time well: Western Europe’s postwar future was clouded by the prospect of a Soviet invasion, American insularity, or German militarism—all possible given the preceding decades of history.

Nearly seventy years later, none of these concerns still exist. Furthermore, NATO's opposing alliance during the Cold War, the Warsaw Pact, quit the Soviet Bloc in 1989, and the Soviet Union itself passed into history in 1991—twenty-seven years ago.

Despite endless searches for a new mission to justify its massive burden on U.S. taxpayers, NATO has failed to be of much use since then. As its boosters like to remind us, after 9/11, the alliance invoked its Article 5 mutual-defense provision on our behalf. But action from America’s allies did not follow the grandiose gesture—the NATO mission in Afghanistan relied mostly on U.S. forces and effectively failed.

Today, the alliance’s bureaucrats and some member states spotlight a threat from Russia as a reason for keeping the organization alive, along with a laundry list of “train and equip” missions.

Yet NATO members' defense budgets don't reflect a real sense of danger from Russia or anyone else. Among the twenty-nine members, only the United States is really serious about its Article 3 obligations to defend itself, spending approximately $700 billion or 3.5 percent of its GDP on defense. No other NATO member comes close to this proportion, and the vast majority fail even to meet the modest, self-imposed requirement to devote at least 2 percent of GDP to defense.

### GLO defense

#### International liberal order is overhyped and chock full of falsities

Patrick Porter ’18, June 5, “A World Imagined: Nostalgia and Liberal Order,” CATO, https://www.cato.org/policy-analysis/world-imagined-nostalgia-liberal-order

According to a view popular in Washington, D.C., and other capitals around the world, the United States used its power and idealism for more than 70 years to create a security and economic order that transformed the world. This world order was liberal because the United States was liberal. “Liberal” in this context means the pursuit of security both through the spread of liberty, in the form of free markets and democratic constitutions, and the rule of law, in the form of rule‐​based international institutions. Today, defenders of that order fear that President Trump and a set of regressive forces are laying waste to it. They claim the consequences are grave: we are witnessing the “end of the West as we know it,”1 the abandonment of “global leadership” by its “long‐​time champion,”2 and a “coming Dark Age.”3 Foreign Affairs, the house organ of the foreign policy establishment, recently asked 32 experts whether the “liberal order is in peril.” Most agreed it is, with 26 respondents registering a confidence level of 7 out of 10.4 Alarmed by the political tumult of our time, nostalgists recall the post‐​1945 moment of institution building and benign internationalism and call for its reclamation.

They are, however, in the grip of a fiction. Liberalism and liberal projects abounded in the past 70 years. But the dream of a unitary, integrated global system organized around liberalism is ahistorical. In truth, the pre‐​Trump world was a more brutal and messy place than the nostalgia allows. To be sure, there was liberalism, and it did help define postwar international relations. Broadly speaking, the post‐​1945 period was, on many measures, more prosperous, less violent, and more collaborative than what came before. One defect of “liberal order” nostalgia is that it exaggerates these qualities and simply leaves out too many contrary historical realities. Other critics have already noted the gap between nostalgia and history and that the postwar world was never “whole.” At times the liberal order was neither very liberal nor very orderly. There may be “islands of liberal order, but they are floating in a sea of something quite different.”5

Not only do nostalgists get the history wrong, they fail to confront what “world ordering” actually entails. The main critique in this paper is that the fetish for “liberal order” has obscured what is involved in the process of “ordering” — or attempting to order — the globe. The United States, as the leading actor in the orthodox narrative, emerges as a power that created order through a benign internationalist vision, consensus building, and institution creating. But the successes and failures of that order also flowed from coercion, compromise, and rougher power politics. As the ordering superpower, the United States did not bind itself with the rules of the system. It upended, stretched, or broke liberal rules to shape a putatively liberal order. Appeals to the myth of a liberal Camelot flow from a deeper myth, of power politics without coercion and empire without imperialism.

This fuller narrative is also a story of tragic limits. The world was not so easily subjugated. Efforts to spread liberalism often contained the seeds of illiberalism. Multiple orders collided and met the limits of their reach and power. Efforts to create a liberal order ended up accommodating illiberalism. Liberalism itself proved to be a conflicted thing. At times, projects to advance it had unexpected results. As it happens, the pursuit of “liberal order” is not just an antidote to the current difficulties suffered by the international system but a source of them.

Ideas about “order” matter and have weighty policy implications. Just as material power enables or forecloses certain choices, ideas condition and constrain a country’s grand strategic decisions. Those who lament the fall of the “liberal order” are saying, in effect, that some ideas are illegitimate and should be off the table. They worry that “populism” and “isolationism” endanger traditional ideas that were once dominant, leading America to abandon its manifold commitments overseas, in turn driving the world into disorder. When they call for the reclamation of the old order, they also call for the perpetuation of American primacy. By contrast, this paper argues that the exaggerated notion of the “liberal order” and its imminent collapse is a myth of the foreign policy establishment and leads America to overstretch.

#### LIO is ineffective especially when led by the U.S.

Amitav Acharya ’20, January 14. “Hegemony and Diversity in the ‘Liberal International Order’: Theory and Reality,” E-INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS, https://www.e-ir.info/2020/01/14/hegemony-and-diversity-in-the-liberal-international-order-theory-and-reality/

Most analysts attribute the uncertain fate of the Liberal International Order (hereafter LIO) to the global power shift, anti-globalization sentiments, and the rise of populist leaders spearheaded by Donald Trump. But the crisis has longer and wider roots in what might be called the hegemony-diversity gap at the heart of the LIO. Supporters present the LIO as an inclusive order offering substantial material benefits to the world while remaining open to participation by all (Deudney and Ikenberry, 1999). Yet, the LIO is also cast as a hegemonic order, both as a product of US (or US-led Western) hegemony and as the dominant world order with no real alternatives. This simultaneous aspiration for diversity and hegemony creates a fundamental tension at the heart of the LIO, especially in the non-Western world, where the LIO is often perceived as a narrow ideological, economic and strategic framework reflecting and advancing the interests and identity of the Western nations led by the US. The LIO’s performance legitimacy from the material benefits it offered to rising powers like China and India is undercut by its normative legitimacy deficit in a world of political and cultural diversity. Meanwhile, in Western nations like the US, the benefits of the LIO offered abroad have become a source of resentment at home, thereby compounding the challenge to the LIO. This article focuses on the LIO’s relationship with the non-Western (Global South, postcolonial) world, and argues that as the LIO loses its presumed “hegemony”, instead of claiming to “co-opt” the Rest, we must embrace the realities of a culturally and political diverse world.

### Climate defense

#### Oceans prove climate change cannot be fixed

Damian Carrington ’22, February 1, “Extreme heat in oceans ‘passed point of no return’ in 2014,” THE GUARDIAN, https://www.theguardian.com/environment/2022/feb/01/extreme-heat-oceans-passed-point-of-no-return-high-temperatures-wildlife-seas

Extreme heat in the world’s oceans passed the “point of no return” in 2014 and has become the new normal, according to research.

Scientists analysed sea surface temperatures over the last 150 years, which have risen because of global heating. They found that extreme temperatures occurring just 2% of the time a century ago have occurred at least 50% of the time across the global ocean since 2014.

In some hotspots, extreme temperatures occur 90% of the time, severely affecting wildlife. More than 90% of the heat trapped by greenhouse gases is absorbed by the ocean, which plays a critical role in maintaining a stable climate.

“By using this measure of extremes, we’ve shown that climate change is not something that is uncertain and may happen in the distant future – it’s something that is a historical fact and has occurred already,” said Kyle Van Houtan, at the Monterey Bay Aquarium, US, and one of the research team. “Extreme climate change is here, it’s in the ocean, and the ocean underpins all life on Earth.”

#### Aggressive action can’t solve

VIVAN SORAB ’19, MARCH 26, “Too Little, Too Late? Carbon Emissions and the Point of No Return,” YALE ENVIRONMENT REVIEW, <https://environment-review.yale.edu/too-little-too-late-carbon-emissions-and-point-no-return>

A recent study asks a related but hitherto unaddressed question: how long do policymakers have to dramatically reduce fossil fuel consumption to meet the Paris Agreement’s 2 degree target? Using the turn of the century as a benchmark, the study analyzes when action would be necessary to ensure that in 2100 the world would meet the Paris Agreement’s target. Scientists from the Universities of Oxford, UK, and Utrecht, The Netherlands outline what they call the Point of No Return, the year after which even aggressive policy measures would be unlikely to meet the Paris Agreement’s goal by the end of the century. Unlike previous studies, this research adds risk to the picture: how would the risk tolerance of policymakers affect the Point of No Return?

### Leadership in Europe fails

#### U.S. hegemony in Europe is not sustainable

Muhittin Ataman ’21, September 19, “Global leadership crisis: The U.S. hegemony vs. China,” DAILY SABAH, https://www.dailysabah.com/opinion/columns/global-leadership-crisis-the-us-hegemony-vs-china

Today’s world is in both a comprehensive transition and a deep crisis. Not only do rivalries and enmities abound but today’s alliances are also quite vulnerable. The survival, duration and sustainability of all these alliances, rivalries and conflicts are in question. In other words, neither conflicting nor cooperative relations are sustainable over the long term. All foreign policy activities are conducted on slippery ground. That is, the direction and pace of any relationship may change at any time.

Therefore, when we analyze the current global balance of power, we have to take these conditions into consideration. No global power pursues a principled foreign policy orientation. Most countries follow an eclectic, sectoral and compartmentalized foreign policy. In this piece, I want to briefly analyze the current foreign relations tendencies of certain global powers.

Leadership crisis

Even though the United States is the most powerful, influential and important international actor, it faces difficulties in maintaining its global leadership. As U.S. relations with other leading global powers are in flux, U.S. relations with its European allies are not sustainable. The U.S. is neither comfortable with the current pace of global relations, nor it is able to change the pace of these events to accommodate its national interests.

#### US-EU cooperation no longer functions – the two aren’t key to each other

Muhittin Ataman ’21, September 19, “Global leadership crisis: The U.S. hegemony vs. China,” DAILY SABAH, https://www.dailysabah.com/opinion/columns/global-leadership-crisis-the-us-hegemony-vs-china

On the other hand, the steps taken by the U.S. in the Indo-Pacific region both directly and indirectly undermine its trans-Atlantic allegiances. It seems that its European/NATO allies will be of lesser importance for the U.S. for the foreseeable future. However, it will continue to cooperate with European countries against the perceived threat from Russia, still the main "other" of the NATO alliance.

The relations between the U.S. and European Union are increasingly problematic. There are brief ups and downs, both alliance and rivalry, in their relationship. European countries do not share many concerns with the U.S. and vice versa. While European countries prioritize their relations with Russia, the U.S. prioritizes its relations with China.

### U.S. hegemony unsustainable

#### Multipolarity is inevitable and peaceful – maintaining U.S. hegemony prompts superpower conflict

Dr. Nadia Helmy ’22, April 14, “The Chinese theory on “the end of American hegemony” after the Ukrainian war,” MODERN DIPLOMACY, https://moderndiplomacy.eu/2022/04/14/the-chinese-theory-on-the-end-of-american-hegemony-after-the-ukrainian-war/

From my point of view, in my personal belief that the multipolar international system has already begun to become clear, and before the outbreak of the Russian-Ukrainian war in the first place, with its many aspects of applications and features. We can find the analyses done by the “Harvard University” in the USA, emphasizing that China is quickly catching up with the United States of America in terms of (technology, military and strategic capabilities), despite the dominance of the United States of America over international finance and research and development.

Here, China is well aware of the (American desire for global hegemony and the unilateral system to direct the whole world). Therefore, the United States of America is concerned about the Chinese and Russian powers, especially after Russia launched its current attack against Ukraine, due to the interference of the United States of America and the West in Russia’s spheres of influence, with an attempt Ukraine’s inclusion in NATO, with the realization that China is the second largest developed economy in the world and has enormous military defense capabilities, and its Russian ally is a formidable military force that Washington and its allies in NATO fear, which was evident during the Ukraine war, as well as regional influence. Russia and China together have intertwined and connected borders and sprawling geographic spaces internally and externally, in addition to the abundance of resources, and the most important thing for me is encouraging their citizens to (belief in the idea of ​​national tide and a sense of popular nationalism and strength globally in the face of American and Western hegemony to stop and limit their power and call for their national popular leaders to rally with their leaders).

China is seeking to achieve a high degree of strategic cohesion with Russia, with (expanding their alliances globally between the developing countries of the South, which are represented in the African, Arab and Latin American countries). Therefore, the United States of America realizes the strength of the alliance and partnership between China and Russia, and the strong support for each other politically, economically, militarily and technologically. China has also become more aware that through deep political, economic and security cooperation with Russia, China will ensure the possibility of forming a multipolarity, with the presence of more than one international and regional pole around the world, with an emphasis on expanding this through (encouraging more different developing countries to join their alliance to reform the current world system, which is dominated by American policies and undermines the sovereignty of weak and marginalized countries by interfering in the internal affairs of countries to ensure their control over them).

We find that in the face of the American economic power, China and Russia together represent about 77% of the gross domestic product of the United States of America alone, in the current value of the dollar and in comparison to the purchasing power parity of Russia and China together compared to Washington, and in addition, the United States of America is now burdened with debt, which has increased to reach about $30 trillion, with (the US debt ratio exceeds many times the value and proportion of its GDP, which China is well aware of about the decline in US economic power globally).

In view of the United States of America’s understanding of the indicators and axes of power, China and Russia, the United States of America has become more and more promoting confrontational concepts in their confrontation, as the most threatening countries to the world. With the American focus on (the issue of the rise of China and the ideological confrontation with the Communist Party of China as a civilization different from the West and liberal American and Western concepts. As a result, Washington has become more eager to impede and halt Chinese growth in particular and limit the scope and limits of the partnership and alliance between China and Russia). Which the Egyptian researcher has carefully analyzed during the Ukrainian-Russian war, with the American insistence on the need for China to adopt a clear position on that Russian war against Ukraine, and Washington’s attempt to take strict commitments against China to ensure that it does not support Russia economically. This is what China and its communist leaders have become aware of, and are aware of these American methods to drive a wedge between it and Russia and President “Putin”.

The whole world is aware that these close relations and alliances between China and Russia are the cornerstone for establishing and forming a multipolar international system, in the face of US policies that are still seeking to preserve their global dominant uniqueness. Therefore, China and Russia are trying to expand the scope of their international partnerships through (the Chinese Silk Road, launching initiatives for development partnership with developing countries of the South, African, Arab countries, Latin and South American countries), because success in this strategy is enough to break that American hegemony, and is a basic guarantee for the transition for a multipolar world.

Here we analyze the impact of the strategic mistakes committed by the United States of America to destabilize the world, by increasing the intensity of conflict and international polarization, as well as its inability to modernize the global system, to overcome shortcomings, challenges and new competitions, but Washington has created many international crises in large parts of the world, Such as: (Afghanistan, Iraq, Syria, Venezuela)…etc. And its spending of a large budget that exceeded 8 trillion dollars for the war on terrorism, which proved the extent of the American failure and impotence in confronting it after its humiliating withdrawal from Afghanistan and the Taliban movement’s control of the government. These are the internationally failed American policies that caused a state of global division in its confrontation.

Therefore, from my point of view, the United States of America is trying here to (take advantage of the crisis of the current Russian war against Ukraine to unite the front of NATO and its members in the West in the face of Russia and President “Putin” under its leadership) to assert its hegemony and uniqueness globally in the face of China and Russia, which is what it must be aware of. The countries of the European Union, in view of the violation by the United States of its covenants and harm to the interests of its European partners, and the most prominent example to me of this issue, is the (American signing of the Aukus military defense agreement with Australia and Britain in the face of France), which caused the Europeans and France to lose that deal, passing Washington’s interests and its excessive selfishness in dealing with its European allies by giving preference to its interests over it and passing it in the face of them, harming them in practice.

On the other hand, the United States of America failed to adapt to the changing global economy, unlike China, after a number of global economic crises, such as: (the Corona virus pandemic, the global financial crisis in 2008, the Ukraine crisis), and others. Which caused (millions of American citizens to lose their jobs, especially in the field of manufacturing and technology), which the United States of America tried to evade internally by blaming the unfair trade policies pursued by China internationally in confronting them.

Here we will find the extent of Chinese President Xi Jinping’s insistence, in all his political speeches, to emphasize the concept of (the common future of humanity), and to emphasize his slogan around (the Chinese dream), to achieve a well-off society, and to work according to the principle of mutual benefit for all, and international profit for all. With President (Xi Jinping’s focusing on the path leading to the realization of this Chinese dream), through three axes, which are: (the Chinese road, the Chinese spirit, and the Chinese power).

The speeches of Comrade Chinese President “Xi Jinping” are focusing on the keys and mechanisms for implementing this Chinese dream in an internationally multipolar world, and the extent to which this is appropriate for China and the rest of the world. We find that the essence of implementing this Chinese dream internally is to reach an internationally multipolar world away from the concepts of American hegemony. Hence, this Chinese dream of an international multilateral world has become (the essence of Chinese national identity by seeking to restore its influence as a force by following China and the ruling Communist Party leaders for several important policies, including the axes of development and reform policy plans across China). In the end, it reflects all (the components of the basic socialist culture and values ​​of China, as well as that Chinese spirit that is in harmony with the goals of the Chinese state, the nation and all the Chinese people).

Based on this aforementioned analysis, we can conclude that American hegemony has already ended globally or is on the way to disappearing or evading, but achieving (a stable global balance of power) is still possible.

### U.S. hegemony bad

#### Transition away from hegemony in Europe and NATO coop is best for stability

Joshua R. Shifrinson ’21, January 28, “The Dominance Dilemma: The American Approach to NATO and its Future,” QUINCY BRIEF NO. 8, https://quincyinst.org/report/the-dominance-dilemma-the-american-approach-to-nato-and-its-future/

In addition, the United States faces diminishing returns, and several negative results, from continuing its present approach to NATO. The alliance has now been enlarged to the point where few strategically meaningful European actors exist outside of NATO’s orbit, even as those that exist, such as Ukraine, would constitute a net loss for U.S. national security by risking a direct conflict with Moscow. In short, little can be gained from continued expansion. Likewise, as European leaders continue pressing for greater autonomy from the United States and NATO, the U.S. will generate increased friction with its allies if it continues to suppress their initiatives in this direction. This tension, meanwhile, comes at a time when Europe itself is of diminishing relative importance to an American grand strategy increasingly fixed on Asia, as most of the actors involved recognize. As the U.S.–led alliance continues moving toward Russia’s borders, it may play some role in driving Moscow and Beijing to cooperate in international affairs. In short, U.S. policy in Asia complicates U.S. strategy in Europe, and vice-versa.

The United States requires a course correction. U.S. policy toward NATO now injects a large degree of instability and unsustainability into the region, which ironically possesses the preconditions for an unprecedented degree of stability thanks in part to prior U.S. efforts. In consequence, the Biden administration should consider proceeding along four tracks, with the goal of significantly reducing the U.S. security presence via NATO.

#### US could always step back in and stabilize Europe

Joshua R. Shifrinson ’21, January 28, “The Dominance Dilemma: The American Approach to NATO and its Future,” QUINCY BRIEF NO. 8, https://quincyinst.org/report/the-dominance-dilemma-the-american-approach-to-nato-and-its-future/

The United States ought to prepare for a broader recalibration of political responsibilities in Europe. Precisely because the United States has other domestic and international obligations, and because NATO’s European members are increasingly disenchanted with U.S. predominance, conditions are ripe to empower the European allies. The objective should be to strengthen intra–European solidarity and cooperation while the United States steps back from active management of European security. The United States should pivot toward becoming the pacifier of last resort rather than the manager of early squabbles.

There are reasons to believe this result is attainable. Many of NATO’s major European players, especially France and Germany, have deepened cooperation in both NATO and non–NATO contexts such as the EU over the past several decades. Disenchantment with U.S. dominance and lingering concerns about Russia provide incentives for sustained cooperation even with a significantly reduced American presence. The United States ought to lean into these trends, returning to its vision of the early postwar years by reducing, limiting, and making more conditional the U.S. presence in the alliance. Over time, such steps could lay the foundation for a comprehensive American withdrawal, providing that Europe remains stable and open to U.S. influence when U.S. interests are involved. Nor would such a retrenchment sacrifice long-term U.S. interests: Should intra–European tensions spike without an American pacifier, America’s lingering connection to the alliance would enable the United States to reengage as needed.

## Off-case

### CP – EU

#### NATO is unable to handle these issues – the EU and other democracies are key

Rasser 20 {“Common Code: An Alliance Framework for Democratic Technology Policy. The Case for a Technology Alliance.” Martijn Rasser () et al. Center for a New American Security. Published in 2020, Accessed June 27, 2022. https://www.jstor.org/stable/pdf/resrep27424.6.pdf} – TW

**Creating a beneficial technology future will require coordination and collaboration**. Technology-leading countries—those with broad-based technological capabilities and committed to liberal norms like democracy, openness, transparency, inclusiveness and a rules-based order—should work together on a range of important but difficult technology matters. While existing alliances and agreements such as NATO, the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), and Wassenaar Arrangement signatories deal with aspects of technology policy, **none are equipped to handle the range of largely interrelated issues that underpin the critical technologies of the 21st century**. **They are also much too large for effective decisionmaking on such matters**. The OECD, while a useful forum for tackling broad issues such as the responsible development of AI—and thus a potentially valuable partner for a technology alliance—is too big and diffuse. The G-7 is closest to being the right entity size-wise. Adapting the economic club to address technological issues, however, would require extensive restructuring and taking on new members, muddling the group’s original purpose in the process. **Instead, the world’s technology-leading liberal democracies**—ten countries and the European Union— should join forces to create a collective foundation where each country can collaborate and compete. A key goal for this group should be to ensure a level playing field where the most innovative and dynamic companies succeed, not those swaddled by mercantilist industrial policies.

### CP – EU-NATO

#### Cooperation between NATO and the EU solves

**SOARE, 21** (SIMONA R. SOARE, Research Fellow for Defence and Military Analysis， PhD in Political Science from the National School for Political and Administrative Studies in Bucharest, 6-11-2021, accessed on 6-25-2022, The German Marshall Fund of the United States, "Innovation as Adaptation: NATO and Emerging Technologies", <https://www.gmfus.org/news/innovation-adaptation-nato-and-emerging-technologies)-JLI>

The Biden administration also provides a window of opportunity to progress and be ambitious in broadening and regularizing NATO-EU cooperation in the field of innovation and EDTs. While political dialogue among their leadership has been steadily increasing over the past five years, the EU and NATO have consulted on their respective EDTs agendas only twice. Furthermore, bureaucratic procedures and misalignments sometimes frustrate even staff-to-staff cooperation in this area. The EU and increasingly NATO are proliferating agencies that conduct work on innovation in EDTs, including in security and defense. This makes it challenging to achieve internal coherence of activities within one organization, let alone coordinating agendas between the two.As the allies meet with the EU High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy Josep Borrell at this month’s NATO summit, the two organizations need a more ambition agenda for cooperation. In particular, the EU and NATO need to consider a joint task force on fostering defense innovation and EDTs, with renewable two-year mandates. This instrument would provide political impetus for closer cooperation on EDTs, it would give coherence, regularity, and structure to the efforts of the two sides, and ensure commonality of purpose and synergy of output. In addition, allies could consider meeting regularly in EU-NATO digital summit formats. The EU could take the lead in this regard given its considerable financial capacity for investing in EDTs and its regulatory powers. EU-NATO digital summits would allow the transatlantic partners to regularly review progress, provide strategic guidance on legal, ethical and adoption challenges related to innovation and EDTs, and enhance their tech diplomacy by inviting like-minded global partners to attend.

### DA – focus uniqueness

#### NATO is focused on China – this is the newest card, assumes the recent summit

**Aljazeera 6-30**-22 (NATO declares China a security challenge for the first time, Al Jazeera, https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2022/6/30/nato-names-china-a-strategic-priority-for-the-first-time, 6-30-22) -JV

NATO has listed China as one of its strategic priorities for the first time, saying Beijing’s ambitions and its “coercive policies” challenge the Western bloc’s “interests, security and values”. The alliance’s new blueprint, or Strategic Concept (PDF), that lays out its priorities for the next decade, was approved at a leader’s summit in Spain on Wednesday. The document directed its harshest language towards Russia, which it described as “the most significant and direct threat” to the alliance’s peace and security, but said Beijing’s military ambitions, its confrontational rhetoric towards Taiwan and its increasingly close ties with Moscow posed “systemic challenges”. “China is substantially building up its military forces, including nuclear weapons, bullying its neighbours, threatening Taiwan … monitoring and controlling its own citizens through advanced technology, and spreading Russian lies and disinformation,” NATO’s Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg told reporters. “China is not our adversary,” he added, “but we must be clear-eyed about the serious challenges it represents.” In response, China on Thursday said it “firmly” opposed NATO’s declaration, calling it a “completely futile” warning. “NATO’s so-called new strategic concept document disregards facts, confuses black and white … [and] smears China’s foreign policy,” foreign ministry spokesman Zhao Lijian said. The official turn by NATO puts the world’s largest military alliance, based on the United States armed forces, on guard against China, which has the world’s second-largest economy and a rapidly growing military, both in numbers and in top-notch technology. “One of the things that [China’s] doing is seeking to undermine the rules-based international order that we adhere to, that we believe in, that we helped build,” said US Secretary of State Antony Blinken. “And if China’s challenging it in one way or another, we will stand up to that.” Western leaders are concerned that Russia’s aggression in Ukraine, which China is yet to condemn, could embolden Beijing to be more assertive over Taiwan. China considers Taiwan a part of its territory with no right to independent recognition as a state or representation on the world stage. Speaking at an event in Madrid that was not part of the NATO summit, British Foreign Secretary Liz Truss said that unless China is checked “there is a real risk that they draw the wrong idea which results in a catastrophic miscalculation such as invading Taiwan,” referring to the self-governing island that China claims as a province. Marcin Jerzewski, head of the Taiwan office of the European Values Center for Security Policy, told Al Jazeera that NATO members may also be concerned about Chinese-Russian military cooperation on Russia’s oft-forgotten Pacific coast. Before the war in Ukraine, Putin began pursuing his own “pivot to the east” by ramping up economic development and his military presence on the Pacific Coast. “This is an important step for NATO and in a way a sign that NATO is waking up to a new geopolitical reality, which is largely defined by the growing confluence of Russian and Chinese strategic interests,” Jerzewski said. “Russia has been viewed mainly as a source of threats in the European theatre, but that view ignores Russia’s physical presence on the shores of the Pacific.” Highlighting NATO’s new focus on China, the gathering of world leaders in Madrid, both inside the bloc’s summit and on its sidelines, included many from Asian nations. It was the first time that the leaders of Japan, South Korea, Australia and New Zealand were invited to a NATO summit. They participated in a NATO session on new global challenges after holding a side meeting outside of the summit. New Zealand’s Prime Minister Jacinda Ardern, speaking at the meeting, said China had become “more assertive and more willing to challenge international rules and norms”. Ardern, whose government has toughened its tone recently on both security and Beijing’s growing presence in the South Pacific, in part due to the signing of a security pact between China and the Solomon Islands, said the resilience of the Indo-Pacific region must be strengthened through relationships and economic architecture rather than militarisation. “We must stand firm on the rules-based order, call for diplomatic engagement and speak out against human rights abuses at all times when and where we see them,” she said. Earlier on Wednesday, Zhao, the Chinese foreign ministry spokesman, had accused NATO of maintaining a “Cold War mentality”. The alliance should give up its “zero-sum game and the practice of creating enemies, and not try to mess up Asia and the whole world after disrupting Europe”, he said. Zhao also criticised the sanctions brought against Russia by NATO members over the Ukraine war, saying “facts have proven that sanctions are not a way out of conflicts, and the continued delivery of weapons will not help realise peace”. China continues to claim it is neutral in the Ukraine war, and has accused NATO and the US of provoking Russia into military action. Weeks before Russia’s February invasion, Chinese President Xi Jinping hosted his Russian counterpart, Vladimir Putin, for a summit at which they pledged a partnership that had “no limits”.

### DA – focus links

#### Biotech is not easy for NATO – magnifies internal divisions and requires wholly new frameworks for coop

Simona R. Soare ’21, June 11, “Innovation as Adaptation: NATO and Emerging Technologies,” GMFUS, https://www.gmfus.org/news/innovation-adaptation-nato-and-emerging-technologies

However, NATO and the transatlantic allies are neither the only nor the most agile actors investing in emerging and disruptive technologies. China and Russia already invest substantially in and have accelerated their adoption of these technologies in military applications. To maintain its strategic advantage against China and Russia, NATO needs to become an agent of innovation and be more agile and strategic in supporting allies to jointly exploit new technologies for deterrence, defense, and resilience purposes. NATO has prioritized EDTs and signaled it has joined “the technological adoption race” against China and Russia.1 Much work remains to be done. Allies remain divided on the ethical and legal specifics of the military use of EDTs and by their national-industrial preferences. Technological capacity across the alliance also varies significantly and, as always, funding is in short supply. Concrete decisions on how to consolidate innovation in EDTs, a critical task for NATO’s mission and future adaptation, are expected at this month’s Brussels summit. Specifically, allies will respond to calls for a “strategic surge” in EDTs2 innovation by establishing a Defense Innovation Accelerator, an opt-in instrument funded through dedicated national contributions, which NATO hopes will incentivize innovation and transatlantic cooperation on emerging technologies.3

#### NATO is internally divided over biotech – plan undermines cohesion

Eddie Walsh ’13, the President of the Emerging Science and Technology Policy Centre, a Senior Fellow at the School of Foreign Service - Georgetown University, and the Director-General of the Pacific Islands Society, “NATO risks unity over emerging technologies divide,” ALJAZEERA, https://www.aljazeera.com/opinions/2013/8/10/nato-risks-unity-over-emerging-technologies-divide

Disruptive innovations

At present, the world is witnessing an unprecedented period of scientific and technological innovation being spurred on by the synergistic combination of converging technologies, including nanotechnology, biotechnology, robotics, information technology, and cognitive science (NBRIC). Such convergence is producing a wide range of disruptive innovations that may contribute to a “tremendous improvement in human abilities, societal outcomes, the nation’s productivity, and the quality of life”. And, current WMD states clearly do not possess a monopoly over such innovation.

Converging technologies also pose fundamental human security challenges. As Francis Fukuyama once argued in Our Posthuman Future: Consequences of the Biotechnology Revolution, converging technologies could inequitably transform the world we live in and, in the process, undermine the very foundations that underpin liberal democracies. Whether or not such a future unfolds, it is clear that their application raises serious ethical and moral issues that are proving divisive for allies and enemies alike (eg: the debates over armed drones and cyber espionage). Even where common approaches can be achieved (eg: combatting designer drugs), converging technologies are growing “faster than our ability to legislate or regulate” them.

The search for consensus

These developments are putting new stresses on the NATO alliance. According to a recent experts workshop, the NBRIC Revolution is threatening NATO unity. “As warfare is outsourced to only those who are ‘near peers’ in technology and societal views shift,” NATO will likely experience “decreasing political tolerance for alliance security efforts”. If NATO member states want to sustain “the traditional transatlantic compact [European political support in return for US military guarantees]”, they must change the way NATO approaches cooperative security around emerging technologies. And, they need to do it now.

#### NATO lacks resources – adopting new tech approaches overwhelms them

Max Bergmann and Siena Cicarelli ’21, January 13, “NATO’s Financing Gap,” AMERICAN PROGRESS, https://www.americanprogress.org/article/natos-financing-gap/

Now, with the COVID-19 crisis hammering the balance sheets of all NATO members, the prospect for European defense spending looks bleak.5 It seems unlikely that there will be significant new investment to address some of NATO’s critical capability gaps. Indeed, the European Union—which had planned to increase funding to upgrade the dual-use infrastructure critical to moving NATO forces—has reduced its planned allocations in its recent budget.6 NATO members seeking to keep their economies alive are unlikely to prioritize defense.

This is a serious problem for the alliance, and NATO needs to think more creatively about how to support continued alliance investment in the wake of the massive economic contraction caused by COVID-19. Simply demanding that countries spend more on defense, which was not very effective prepandemic, will certainly not work now.

What has become apparent is that NATO’s default focus on individual nation-state spending commitments was doing little to address alliancewide issues. Collectively, European NATO members spend as much on defense as Russia, yet the disaggregated and loosely coordinated spending by individual states means that the alliance’s combat strength is well short of what it could be and has left critical gaps in its capabilities.

NATO, since its founding, has lacked the resources to fill gaps and make investments. The alliance has overlooked one of its potentially most powerful assets—the collective economic and financial clout of its members. NATO has not leveraged its collective financial stature and the position of its many wealthy members to shore up the alliance. In the wake of the COVID-19 crisis, this must change through the creation of its own bank.